RANDOM OBSERVATIONS ON JUDICIAL
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The following essay is excerpted from Professor Stanley Van Ness F
lecture, delivered on May 8, 1984, as part of the Hughes Forum. This
program is operated annually under the auspices of the Richardj. Hughes
Chairfor Constitutionaland Pubhc Law and Service at Seton Hall Law
SchooL The Chairis endowed by the New Jersey Legislature in honor of the
former Governor and ChiifJusticeof the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Professor Van Ness, who held the Chairfrom 1982 to 1984, is the former
Pubh'c Advocate and Pubhc Defender of the State of New Jersey.
I speak to you neither as a jurist nor a scholar, but as a bulk consumer, over the past fifteen years, of judicial services in the State of New
Jersey. Jurists have occasionally written articles on judicial independence,' but with the somewhat defensive tone of an oft-criticized group
seizing upon a rare chance to respond. I must also dispel any lingering
illusion of scholarship surrounding me. During my two years at Seton
Hall, I have taught more from experience than theory and this address
is no exception. So again, my perspective is that of a bulk consumer of
judicial services.
In this capacity I distinguish myself from the ordinary citizen or
from the ordinary state senator who has had perhaps a few contacts with
our judicial system and who has drawn some conclusions from those
contacts. Usually that person's view of judicial confidence or judicial
independence is colored very much by whether the person has won or
lost in the courts. An extreme example that is hard to forgive, but not
hard to understand, is why Senator Cardinale might generalize from a
few specifics to threaten the career of one of the most outstanding jurists
in the state.2 Such action not only undermines confidence in our legisla*
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I See, e.g., Burger, The Interdependence ofJudict2 andJoumahlsticIndependence, 63 GEO.

L.J. 1195 (1975); Hughes, Judicia/Independence, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 13 (1979); Kaufman,
Chilling JuidcialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979); Mosk, "Chilling Judicial Independence"'-The CaliforniaExperience, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1980).
2 In 1983, New Jersey State Senator Gerald Cardinale attempted to block the reappointment of New Jersey Superior Court Judge Sylvia Pressler through the exercise of
"senatorial courtesy." This unwritten custom allows a home county senator to block,
without explanation, a gubernatorial appointment. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983, at
B2, col. 1. Prior to becoming a Senator, Cardinale had been involved in four cases
before Judge Pressler and had lost three of them. The (Newark) Star-Ledger, Sept. 20,

1983, at 22, col. 4. Because of Cardinale's appearances before Judge Pressler as a liti-

gant, the State Senate refused his attempt to invoke senatorial courtesy, due to the ap-
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ture, but also seriously threatens the independence of a large segment of
the judges of this state. All those who have not yet reached seven years
and been reappointed must now wonder whether some judge or senator
will pop up at the time of reappointment to question whether a particular decision was appropriate or not.
Fortunately, that effort was
quashed.
What is this judicial independence that we're talking about, where
does it come from, and what is its present and future place in a democratic society? The topic can be approached from two levels. First and
most prevalent, judicial independence is the freedom of an individual
judge to render a decision independent of influence or pressure. Second,
it is this same freedom but preserved for the institution itself. Even an
extremely condensed history of judicial independence shows the interdependence of these two levels. Thus Sir Edward Coke shortened his judicial career and nearly shortened his life by suggesting that King James I
was wrong when he urged that all must recognize and bow to judicial
prerogative. I believe Sir Edward suggested that the King's prerogatives
are no greater than those which the law of the land have given him.
After he said that, he spent the next several hours groveling on the floor
in front of King James to preserve his head.' In 1616, the King decided
he no longer needed his services. He was fortunately left with his head.
Perhaps Justice Coke's then outrageous views were tolerated because despite his protestations, the royal judiciary had no authority, no
separate power. They served at the pleasure of the King. Their salaries
parent conflict of interest. His three hour testimony before the Senate hearing included
an attack on her dismissal of criminal charges against a defendant who later stabbed his
mother. The late Justice John J. Francis of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct testified that no complaints against Judge Pressler were ever filed during her tenure. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983, at B2, col. 2. The attempted use of senatorial courtesy
brought renewed criticism of the custom. See "Senatorial Courtesy" A Public Outrage, 112
NJ.L.J. 313 (1983)(editorial denouncing the "ludicrous situation"); N.Y. Times, Oct. 4,
1983, at B2, col. 2 (Chief Justice Wilentz claims that custom threatens judicial independence and honesty); The (Newark) Star-Ledger, Sept. 18, 1983, at A22, col. 3 (Governor
Kean characterizes senatorial courtesy as "dangerously bad"). But see Letter from William Dowd to the Editor of New Jersey Law Journal, reprinted in 112 N.J.L.J. 340
(1983)(defending "rule" for granting home county senator some much needed power to
help offset Governor's power of appointment).
3 E. COKE, ORACLE OF THE LAw 179 (1929). The exact exchange was as follows:
'The common law protecteth the King,' said Coke. 'That is a traitorous
speech,' shouted James in great anger; 'the King protecteth the law, and not
the law the King. The King maketh judges and bishops'; and he denounced
Coke so fiercely and excitedly, rising in his chair and shaking his fists in
Coke's face, that the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, 'fell
flat on all fower' before the King, and humbly begged his pardon; but it was
not until Salisbury interposed on Coke's behalf that the King was somewhat
mollified.
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could be changed at will: if the coffers overflowed, perhaps more, if the
King was displeased, perhaps less.
Eighty-five years after Coke had been dismissed as Chief Judge, judicial independence was recognized, at least as it related to the King visa-vis the Act of Settlement.4 From that time on, the judges were to be
appointed for life or good behavior, given fixed salaries, and removed
from the bench only upon address of both Houses of Parliament. Parliament's claimed ascendancy over the King thus spawned political liberty
in England.
However, colonial judges continued to be appointed by the King,
and their salaries were established by Royal prerogative.5 The criticism
of King George III for this solitary exercise of will over the judges' tenure and salary was so substantial a grievance that it warranted inclusion
in the Declaration of Independence. 6 After the Revolution, and after
long debate, the Framers embraced a limited form of Government-a
tri-partite form, which for the first time provided for a co-equal, independent branch of government known as the Judiciary. The Judges
were to be appointed separate of the Congress and the Executive; their
tenure and salary were to be fixed independently, and most important,
the source of their power would flow directly from the Constitution
rather than from the other branches of Government.
There were some who doubted the wisdom of that innovation. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, for one, declined to sign the Constitution
because he viewed Article Three as an establishment of a judiciary in
terrorem-suggestingthat there was too much fear expressed in Article
4 12 & 13 Will., ch. 2, § 3(7) (1701). That statute proclaimed, in part: "Judges'
commissions be made quamdiu se bent gesserit (during good behavior), and their salaries
ascertained and established; but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament it may
be lawful to remove them." Id
5 See C. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 17601776 (1933).
6 The relevant provision provides: "He has made Judges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
The Declaration of Independence para. 11 (U.S. 1776). Perhaps the eighteenth century
colonists were so infuriated because the earlier colonial constitutions had granted greater
local autonomy for the administration of justice. Compare CONCESSIONS OF WEST NEW
JERSEY, 1676, ch. XLI ("[A]II the justices and constables [should] be chosen by the people . . . and chief justices . . . [should] be chosen by the General Free Assembly."),
repritedti W. MACDONALD, SELECT CHARTERS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY

1606-1775, at 182 (1898) with MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNMENT ACT, 1774, ch.VI
("[U]pon every vacancy of the offices of chief justice and judges of the superior
court . . . the governor . . . without the consent of the council, shall have full power
and authority to nominate and appoint the persons to succeed to the said offices, who
shall hold their commissions during the pleasure of his Majesty."), reprintedin W. MACDONALD, supra, at 346.
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Three of the other two branches of Government. 7 Alexander Hamilton,
among others, attempted to reeducate Randolph, and Federalist No. 78
set forth the relationship that he saw: the judiciary balancing the other
branches of Government. He said the judiciary would be the weakest of
the three, that it would be least dangerous to citizens' rights under the
Constitution. He went on to say that it would have "neither FORCE
nor WILL, but merely judgment.'' 8
We could all agree that Alexander Hamilton was the master of understatement. It was in 1803 when Justice Marshall asserted the
supremacy of the judiciary: the judicial branch of the Government
would determine what the law is and any law repugnant to the Constitution would be void.9 This didn't sit well with Jefferson or with Congress; some intuited this as an usurpation of power. But when they
searched through the Constitution they could find only the impeachment power.' ° And indeed, they successfully tried that out on a Judge
by the name of Pickering, who was impeached for being a man of loose
morals and bad habits." History tells us that that wasn't too hard a
charge to sustain in Judge Pickering's case. But when that same power
was sought to be exercised against Justice Chase,12 the result was different. It became very clear that the impeachment power was going to be
a cumbersome vehicle by which to regulate the judiciary. So the other
governmental branches started to recognize that there was a new boy on
the block, as strong as the others. And though conflicts were sought to
be avoided, they inevitably occurred. This is where the second aspect of
judicial independence is most important-where the institution itself is
in danger of being manipulated or controlled. Obviously, if the institution is not free, there will be little room for the free exercise of independent judgment by judges within the system. So in those two regards, I
speak of judicial independence.
7 See Friedlander,Jicia Supremacy: Some Btcentennza/Refltctns, 8 RUT-CAM. L.J. 24,
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 310 (M. Far-

29 (1976) (citing 3
rand ed. 1966)).

8 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton)

(J. Cooke ed. 1961).

9 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, provides that "the President, Vice-President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
1 See I. BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 46-57 (1972). The constitutional question of whether the conduct of Pickering, an alcoholic, amounted to "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" was not addressed-the Senate merely found him "guilty as
charged in the first article of impeachment" and hence removed him from office. Id. at

56.
12 Chase was acquitted. See S. SMITH & T. LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE (1805).
The political nature of the attack on Chase, an ardent Federalist, is documented in
Brant, supra note 11, at 58-83.
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New Jersey was slow to emulate the Federal model. It wasn't until
1844 that we even instituted the separation of powers in our constitution. As the former Governor pointed out in his opening remarks, the
judicial system under that constitution left a great deal to be desired. 3
In 1947, our judicial system came of age with the assistance of such notables as Learned Hand, Roscoe Pound, Arthur Vanderbilt, Nathan Jacobs, Al Clapp, and others. In 1947, delegates to that convention
adopted a system of appointed judges and placed in a Chief Justice the
authority and the responsibility to run the system. They also established
an administrative office of the courts and recognized that there was rulemaking power reposed within the state supreme court. Some say that
and expanded it
Justice Vanderbilt immediately took the latter power
considerably when he decided the Winberry case,1 4 but even after that
decision, Roscoe Pound was heard to say that the best court system in
the United States was the one that had been established here in New
Jersey by the 1947 constitution. 5 I think that that reputation not only
continues, but grows with modern innovations, such as the merger of the
county and superior courts and the creation of a family court.
Let me hasten to add that I do not think that the system alone
would have entitled us to that kind of evaluation, were it not for the fact
that we have been very fortunate to have had at the helm of the court
men such as Arthur Vanderbilt, Joseph Weintraub, Governor Hughes,
and now Robert Wilentz. They have administered a system that is renowned for its demonstrated judicial competence, and almost entirely
free of any taint of scandal. So much so that when former Governor
Hughes commented in 1977 that the New Jersey court system was totally unpolitical and completely independent, 6 he could say so without
fear of contradiction.
What then does this power of judicial independence mean in a
democratic society? Under both Federal and state models the judges are
13 Former Governor Richard J. Hughes observed that the system of justice under
that constitution "was considered the worst in the United States." Opening Remarks of
Governor Richard J. Hughes, Hughes Forum (May 8, 1984).
14 Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
15 Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court tn New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1952).
Dean Pound was unequivocal in his praise:
New Jersey had definitely been put in the lead among American jurisdictions in provision of a judiciary organized and empowered to administer
justice speedily, efficiently, and at no more than reasonable expense in the
complex, urban, industrial society of today, charged also with definitely
placed responsibility commensurate with the power.
Id. at 28; see also Pound, The Causesof PopularDissatisfactionwith the Admnitration ofjustice,
8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (citing New Jersey as the state with the most modernly organized
court system).
16 See generally Hughes, supra note 1.
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appointed. Note that even if we were talking about an elected system, it
would still be a question of appointment-it is just where the appointment takes place, whether it is at the clubhouse or the State House. In
any event, the following questions can be asked: "By what right do
these people who are elected by no one make rules which govern everyone? By what right do they tell us that we have to bus our children
across town to integrate schools? By what right do they tell us that we
can't pray in our schools? By what right do they tell us that we should
administer our institutions in one way as opposed to another? By what
right do they tell us how much we should spend for the education of a
child? By what right do they tell us what our zoning ordinances should
look like and what opportunities those ordinances should provide for the
housing of lower and moderate income citizens in this state?"
There are a number of eminent scholars and lawyers who say "by
no right." By no right does the Court have the power to act as it has
been acting. Scholars such as Philip Kurland and Alexander Bickel
have on occasion chided the United States Supreme Court for grasping for power. 7 The typical judge's response is that such judicial
action is proper when the other branches of government fail to respond. A weak argument, however, may be made that if the Executive and Legislature, which have greater resources and opportunities
to study whether these things should be done, choose not to do them,
it is because no one knows how, or because there is not enough
money to go around, or because the public just doesn't want them
done. 18
Scholars are not the only ones who have raised the question, "By
what right?" Indeed a number of legislators at one time or another have
said "by what right" when confronted by a particular decision, and
have relied on the dubious precedent of ex parle McCardle 9 to say that
they can introduce bills that will withdraw appellate jurisdiction from
the Supreme Court. A number of such bills have been introducedGovernor Hughes mentioned thirty in his opening remarks, and I have
no quarrel with that-touching on everything from the question of admissibility of confessions to school prayer to abortion. Any controversial
decision by the United States Supreme Court has been matched by the
17 See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Kurland, Earl Warren, the
"Warren Court," and the Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968).
18 A similar argument was advanced by New Jersey Legislators who were opposed to
the active role taken by the state supreme court in prescribing housing allocations. See
Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionay Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON HALL L. REV.
851, 886 (1984). But seeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 102-03 (1980) (upholding judicial activism when the relative independence of
the appointed judges will best serve as "channels of change").
19 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
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introduction of some bill to withdraw the jurisdiction from the Court.
As clumsy and unsuccessful as it is, there is the occasional resort to the
impeachment process. Most recently was the battle led by then Congressman Ford to impeach William 0. Douglas-unsuccessful, thank
God.
The courts, by what right? Well, I suppose you could even mention
the vast segments of our population that have occasionally asked that
question. The signs that suggested we impeach Earl Warren came from
all sources-from the scholars, the lawyers, the legislators, the average
person in the street. Yet through all the years of this republic, courts
have maintained the support of the populace. People have voluntarily
obeyed the mandates coming from the courts. When the independence
of the court is threatened, the public reacts. When President Roosevelt
sought to pack the Court in 1937, at the height of his political power, he
found an immediate and emphatic repudiation of his activities in the
election of 1938. In that year the electorate turned out many New Deal
Congressmen-some say largely on the issue of judicial independence.
The public has supported the courts because I think they believe
that the courts are honest, neutral, and fair. But there is another reason
as well. Not only do the people view the courts as honest and neutral
and fair, but there is a well-spring of fairness within the American people themselves. The American people are 'prepared to be convinced that
they are better than they think they are. They are prepared to put aside
their own self interests when someone points out to each how unfair the
exercise of that self interest has been.
I don't think that there is any question but that the vast majority of
Americans today would say it was unfair that blacks were segregated
and discriminated against in the South and elsewhere in this country for
so many years. The vast majority of Americans would say that it is
unfair to deprive a patient in a mental hospital, or even an inmate in a
jail, of humane treatment because of the cost associated with it. I think
people here in New Jersey would say it is unfair to live in suburbs ringed
by zoning laws that keep out the poor, because people have a right to
decent housing. In these instances the courts have merely pointed out
the fairness or the unfairness of a situation and the public has recognized and accepted it.
When I was young, I used to go to Ebbet's Field to watch the
Brooklyn Dodgers play. I do not know how many of you ever had that
experience, but the fans there were knowledgeable, vociferous, and some
say rabid. On more than one occasion I would hear somebody shout,
with great sincerity, "Kill the umpire" after some questionable call. Yet
the game continued-not without argument, but without mayhem. I
think that the umpire was safe because the people knew that if you
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threatened, intimidated, or cowed the umpire, the game they loved so
dearly would never be the same.
I think the American people know that if you allow the judiciary to
be threatened, intimidated, or cowed, our government would never be
the same again. I believe the courts can count on the support of an
independent people for an independent judiciary. But I do not think
the courts can take this support for granted. The courts must be worthy
of the people's trust. Hence the importance of the state's committeelay members-who can look impartially at the judiciary's conduct. Also
the courts should not overreach. We cannot ignore the criticisms of the
Kurlands or the Bickels. When it is possible to defer to the other
branches of government, then that should be done. But where the constitutional mandate is clear, the courts cannot shirk their duty. As Justice Wilentz said in Mount Laurel I,2" when confronted with the
argument that this was not something that the judiciary should be doing-that it is something the legislature should be doing-he said,
"[W]e may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.""1 As
long as the judges in this state and elsewhere enforce the constitution
honestly and fairly, they will enjoy the support of the people, as well as
their judicial independence. They should not enjoy it one day longer.
20

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,

456 A.2d 390 (1983).
21 Id.at 213, 456 A.2d at 417.

